Centre for Discrete and Applicable Mathematics |
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CDAM Research Report, LSE-CDAM-2002-02April 2002 |
Françoise Forges and Bernhard von Stengel
Abstract
The solution concept of ``correlated equilibrium'' allows for coordination in games. For game trees with imperfect information, it gives rise to NP-hard problems, even for two-player games without chance moves. We introduce the ``extensive form correlated equilibrium'' (EFCE), which extends Aumann's correlated equilibrium, where coordination is achieved by signals that are received ``locally'' at information sets. An EFCE is polynomial-time computable for two-player games without chance moves.
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