Centre for Discrete and Applicable Mathematics
	CDAM Research Report, LSE-CDAM-2003-13 August 2003

Abstract

This note gives a general and very short proof of the following property of a a duopoly game, for example of price or quantity competition. If the game is symmetric, has a unique Nash equilibrium, and players' payoffs are monotonic in the opponent's choice along their own best response function, then the follower's payoff is either higher than the leader's, or lower than even in the simultaneous game. A possible interpretation is that ``endogenous'' timing is difficult since the players either want to move both second or both first.

A PDF file (62 kB) with the full contents of this report can be downloaded by clicking here.

Alternatively, if you would like to get a free hard copy of this report, please send the number of this report, LSE-CDAM-2003-13, together with your name and postal address to: Sorry, this report is currently yet not available in electronic format. To obtain a free hard copy, please send the number of this report, LSE-CDAM-2003-13, together with your name and postal address to:

		CDAM Research Reports Series Centre for Discrete and Applicable Mathematics London School of Economics Houghton Street London WC2A 2AE, U.K.
		Phone: +44(0)-20-7955 7732. Fax: +44(0)-20-7955 6877. Email: info@maths.lse.ac.uk

		Introduction to the CDAM Research Report Series.
		CDAM Homepage.

Last changed: Wed 9 Feb 2005
For comments go to: http://www.maths.lse.ac.uk/webmaster.html